NASA Nearly Chose Boeing Alone—Starliner Still Isn’t Certified
NASA nearly selected Boeing alone for the decisive certification and flight phase of its Commercial Crew Program in 2014. A reconstruction of the internal deliberations describes a Boeing-only selection document that had already been drafted before officials changed course and included SpaceX.
The consequences are now clear, although the popular shorthand that NASA almost gave Boeing “all” its crew funding needs qualification. The June 2026 NASA inspector general audit found that Starliner remained uncertified after three flight tests, identified unresolved propulsion, helium-leak and parachute problems, recorded 12 completed Crew Dragon missions since certification, and judged a Starliner certification date in 2027 more realistic than the agency’s earlier fall 2026 target.
The near-miss concerned one critical contract phase
NASA did not consider transferring every dollar associated with astronaut transportation to Boeing. The choice concerned Commercial Crew Transportation Capability, known as CCtCap: the phase intended to complete development, certify an integrated transportation system and purchase flights to the International Space Station.
That distinction matters because Commercial Crew had already passed through earlier development agreements and certification-planning contracts. Boeing, SpaceX and other companies had received different forms of support before the final competition. The near-selection of Boeing alone would have excluded SpaceX from CCtCap, not erased every previous investment in Crew Dragon.
The competition also involved proposed systems rather than spacecraft with established human-flight records. Boeing carried the reputation of a longstanding NASA contractor, while SpaceX had only recently begun delivering cargo to the station. Evaluators therefore had to judge designs, management plans, schedules and safety approaches before either company had flown astronauts.
Within that setting, choosing an established aerospace company could appear less risky. The later outcome does not prove that officials should have predicted every Starliner problem; it shows why confidence in a contractor is not a substitute for maintaining an independent technical path.
The final awards created genuinely separate systems
NASA’s current Commercial Crew record identifies two firm fixed-price CCtCap awards made in September 2014, with maximum values of $4.2 billion for Boeing and $2.6 billion for SpaceX.
The difference in contract value did not make Crew Dragon a component of Boeing’s program or a secondary capsule controlled by the larger contractor. Each company was responsible for its own integrated spacecraft, launch vehicle, ground operations and path through NASA’s human-rating process.
Boeing paired Starliner with United Launch Alliance’s Atlas V. SpaceX developed Crew Dragon around its Falcon 9 launch system. A defect in one architecture therefore did not automatically ground the other—a practical advantage that goes beyond having two corporate names on a procurement document.
This is the central reason the dual award mattered. NASA did not know which development effort would finish first, and the agency could not assume that apparently strong proposals would encounter the same problems on the same schedule. Funding separate systems preserved options across hardware, launch operations and certification.
Starliner’s test program did not produce certification
Starliner’s flight tests exposed problems at several levels. Its initial orbital attempt failed to reach the station, the subsequent uncrewed mission docked but produced further anomalies, and the crewed test revealed serious propulsion and helium-system issues during the approach.
The crewed capsule eventually returned without its astronauts. That decision allowed engineers to recover the vehicle without exposing the crew to uncertainties surrounding its propulsion performance, but it also meant the mission could not establish the evidence required for routine astronaut service.
The next planned Starliner-1 flight has consequently been changed from an operational crew rotation to an uncrewed cargo and validation mission. Its purpose is to exercise modified systems in space before NASA considers placing another crew aboard.
Even a successful flight will not automatically complete certification. An uncrewed mission cannot reproduce every crew-dependent operation, including human interactions with the spacecraft during departure and return. Boeing and NASA must also finish remaining tests, close technical findings and complete the formal certification review.
Crew Dragon became the operational path
SpaceX reached human-rating certification and moved into regular station rotations while Starliner remained in development. Crew Dragon consequently became NASA’s only operational domestic Commercial Crew system, despite Boeing receiving the larger original CCtCap award.
That outcome is stronger evidence for procurement redundancy than for declaring one contractor inherently reliable. SpaceX also encountered technical and scheduling problems during development. The decisive difference is that its system completed certification and was available when delays prevented Boeing from supplying operational flights.
A hypothetical Boeing-only program cannot be reconstructed with certainty. NASA might eventually have reopened the competition, purchased more transportation from Russia or created another contingency. Each alternative, however, would have required additional time, negotiation or development after Starliner’s difficulties had become apparent.
By retaining SpaceX in CCtCap, NASA already had another American system moving through the same broad certification objective. The agency did not need to begin a replacement program from zero when Boeing’s schedule slipped.
The original redundancy goal remains unfinished
The dual award protected NASA from dependence on the provider that experienced the longer delay, but it has not yet delivered two operational American crew vehicles. Routine station access still depends on Crew Dragon whenever NASA requires a domestic Commercial Crew flight.
That leaves a vulnerability in the opposite direction. If Crew Dragon or Falcon 9 were unavailable for an extended period, NASA could not simply transfer astronauts to a certified Starliner mission. Seat exchanges with Russia provide another layer of access, but they are not the independent domestic capability that the competing contracts were intended to create.
Starliner-1 therefore matters less as a symbolic comeback than as a test of whether Boeing can finally supply that missing second route. With the International Space Station approaching the end of its planned operating life, every additional delay reduces the period in which NASA could use an operational Starliner fleet.
The durable lesson from the selection is narrow but important: NASA’s late decision to fund competing systems preserved the spacecraft that ultimately entered routine service. It prevented a difficult development program from becoming the agency’s only domestic path for transporting astronauts to the station.
Also read:
Subscribe to our newsletter
Get the latest Web3, AI, and crypto news delivered straight to your inbox.